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A B S T R A C T
It is a well-documented phenomenon that a group's gender composition can impact group performance.
Understanding why and how this phenomenon happens is a prominent puzzle in the literature. To shed light on
this puzzle, we propose and experimentally test one novel theory: through the salience of gender stereotype, a
group's gender composition affects a person's willingness to lead a group, thereby impacting the group's overall
performance. By randomly assigning people to groups with varying gender compositions, we find that women in
mixed-gender groups are twice as likely as women in single-gender groups to suffer from the gender stereotype
effect, by shying away from leadership in areas that are gender-incongruent. Further, we provide evidence that
the gender stereotype effect persists even for women in single-gender groups. Importantly, however, we find that
public feedback about a capable woman's performance significantly increases her willingness to lead. This result
holds even in male-stereotyped environments.
Introduction
The gender composition of teams, and how it impacts organizational
outcomes, has attracted increasing attention in the media and the lea-
dership literature. Recently, for example, people have heatedly debated
the benefits of increasing the female presence on boards, and the merits
of gender diversity in leadership1. It is well-substantiated that female
and male leaders differ systematically in their core values, leadership
style and risk attitudes (cf., Adams, Funk, Barber, Ho, & Odean, 2012;
Druskat, 1994; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992). The extant litera-
ture has yet to reach a consensus on the causal effects of the gender
diversity of corporate boards on firms' performance, with some studies
yielding positive results, and others producing null or negative out-
comes (e.g., Eagly, 2016; Yang, Riepe, Moser, Pull, & Terjesen, 2019). It
is worth noting that some benefits of greater female leadership include
female leaders as role models for fellow aspiring women in the orga-
nizations ( cf., Arvate, Galilea, & Todescat, 2018; Gilardi, 2015).
The call for gender diversity is especially loud within male-domi-
nated and traditionally male-stereotyped industries, such as the tech-
nology industry. A special report by the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) highlighted the technology sector as
having particularly “concerning trends” in employment, despite being a
major source of economic growth. The technology sector employed a
significantly smaller share of women compared to overall private in-
dustry (36% in technology and 48% overall in private industry). The
fact that women are underrepresented in a male-dominated high
earning industry is hardly surprising. Similar patterns were observed in
political sphere where women are underrepresented in legislative
bodies ( cf., Kanthak & Woon, 2015). Gender stereotypes, especially
stereotype-based expectations of inferiority, are considered to be the
major factors contributing to the absence of gender diversity and un-
derrepresentation of women, especially in leadership roles. Gender-
based expectations, founded in stereotype bias, can impact not only
who people regard as “fitting” for leadership roles, but also a person's
willingness to lead (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Hoyt & Blascovich, 2010;
Hoyt & Murphy, 2016).
The effect of gender composition on organizational performance
and group decision-making has been well documented using both ob-
servational and experimental data. Intriguingly, this effect persists even
after controlling for observable characteristics of individuals
(Apesteguia, Azmat, & Iriberri, 2012; Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014;
Bagues, Sylos-Labini, & Zinovyeva, 2017; Berge, Juniwaty, & Sekei,
2016; Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, & Praag, 2013; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter,
2013; Kirsch, 2018; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Nevertheless, the
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literature has yet to solve the puzzle of how and through which channels
gender composition affects group performance. This question is cru-
cially important to academics, organizations, and policy makers. To
formulate appropriate policy interventions, we must shed light on the
underlying mechanisms at work.
In this paper, we take a step towards filling the gap in the literature.
We design and implement laboratory experiments to test an important
potential mechanism: as a result of gender stereotyping, the gender
composition of a group may moderate one's willingness to lead a group.
For example, if, in gender-diverse groups, relatively lower-skilled men
are more likely to lead than higher-skilled women, this could detri-
mentally impact the quality of the group's output (holding other group
members' ability constant).
Gender stereotypes are widely held in society. According to ste-
reotype threat theory (Steele & Aronson, 1995), stereotype boost theory
(Shih, Pittinsky, & Ho, 2011), and role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau,
2002), people are expected to perform better when characteristics re-
quired for a task are congruent with gender stereotypes (positive ste-
reotypes) about their social group (e.g., men are more proficient at
mathematical tasks). By contrast, they are expected to perform worse
when these characteristics are incongruent with gender stereotypes
(negative stereotypes) about their social group (e.g., women are less
proficient at mathematical tasks). We denote this effect the gender ste-
reotype effect (GSE). Coffman (2014) demonstrated empirically across
decision domains with varying gender stereotype that when holding
ability constant, women (men) are less likely to put forward their an-
swers as the group lead answers to male (female) stereotyped problems.
Inefficiency is the potential negative consequence, stemming especially
from under-contribution by equally able women in male-stereotyped
domains, and equally competent men in female-stereotyped domains.
In this paper, we explore why a group's gender composition is likely
to influence its performance through GSE. By varying the comparison
set, a group's gender composition could impact the salience of one's
gender identity and her corresponding gender stereotype (Cohen &
Swim, 1995; Cota & Dion, 1986; Hoyt, Johnson, Murphy, & Skinnell,
2010). For example, when a woman is in an all-female group, her fe-
male gender identity may become less salient and she may suffer less
from GSE, in that her willingness to lead the group may be less influ-
enced by the gender stereotype of the decisions. As a result, she may be
equally likely to take the lead and offer her qualified ideas to both male
and female stereotyped tasks and improve the overall group perfor-
mance. By contrast, if a woman is placed in a majority-male group, her
female identity may become more salient and she may hold back when
confronted with male-stereotyped problems. Not only is the overall
quality of the group's ideas reduced, but a woman (man) in a male
(female) dominated group may be more likely to be overlooked for
promotion or advancement opportunities as a consequence of shying
away from providing her talents to the team.
Our contributions are fourfold: First, we offer and empirically test a
novel mechanism for the gender composition effect on willingness to
lead and team performance using tasks from different decision domains.
Ours is one of the first studies to bring together insights from psy-
chology, management, leadership studies and economics, and provide
new evidence on why gender composition affects performance. Second,
we make a significant methodological contribution to the literature.
Much of the previous observational research about the gender compo-
sition effect on performance in management and applied psychology
has been correlational and not causally identified (cf., Antonakis,
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich,
Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010; Miller & Del Carmen Triana, 2009; Smith,
Smith, & Verner, 2006). Even when laboratory experiments have been
used to establish the causality, measures of the dependent variables
have not been consequential or incentivized (cf., Heilman & Haynes,
2005). In particular, one of the main techniques used in the literature to
activate GSE—gender priming—is currently under debate due to re-
plicability and experimenter demand concerns (Cesario, 2014; Doyen,
Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Flore, Mulder, & Wicherts, 2019;
Lonati, Quiroga, Zehnder, & Antonakis, 2018). In contrast to previous
research, we exogenously and subtly vary the gender composition of the
group to trigger GSE. Likewise, all decisions made in our experiment are
adequately incentivized. In so doing, we minimize the experimenter
demand effect and offer an ecologically valid measure of the outcome
variables, while still enabling rigorous inference regarding the causal
link between gender composition, willingness to lead, and performance.
Third, we offer important new evidence that public performance feed-
back effectively encourages qualified women to lead, even in male-
typed environments. Finally, our study contributes to the literature on
leader emergence. Whereas previous key contributions have focused on
the personality traits of leaders (e.g., Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt,
2002), we focus instead on features of the environment (particularly
gender stereotype and gender composition) that shape incentives for
individuals to pursue leadership (Zehnder, Herz, & Bonardi, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Literature re-
view reviews the relevant literature; Experimental design and proce-
dures describes the experimental design and procedure; Predictions
outlines our predictions; Results presents the main results; Discussion
discusses and Conclusion concludes.
Literature review
Instrumental leadership
Our study focuses on functional and instrumental leadership beha-
vior (sometimes equated to pragmatic leadership) (Antonakis & House,
2014; Lord, 1977; Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010; Mumford & Van
Doorn, 2001), as compared to transactional or charismatic and trans-
formational leadership (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). For a comprehensive
review of leadership styles, see Anderson and Sun (2017).
Following Antonakis and House (2014 p.749), instrumental lea-
dership is “the application of leader expert knowledge on monitoring of
the environment and of performance, and the implementation of
strategy and tactical solution.” Fleishman et al. (1991) point to the
responsibility of the leader in problem solving, and suggest that to be
effective, a leader must be equipped with problem-solving skills and
expert knowledge (Connelly et al., 2000; Morgeson et al., 2010). The
problem-solving role of leaders seems especially critical when a team
faces complex tasks (French & Raven, 1968).
In economics, there is growing interest in studying leadership, al-
though leadership has yet to become an established subfield. As ela-
borated by Zehnder et al. (2017), the leadership literature in psy-
chology and management has been largely running in parallel to the
leadership literature in economics. We are one of the first studies to
bridge those fields. We use laboratory economics experiments to cap-
ture instrumental leadership, and more importantly, the willingness to
lead. To the best of our knowledge, we are one of the first studies to
investigate one's willingness to lead using an incentive-compatible eli-
citation method. A topic in the literature closely linked with willingness
to lead is leadership aspiration, which is shown to predict leader
emergence (see, e.g., Reitan & Stenberg, 2019). In our environment,
group members coordinate to solve problems from different fields.
Consequently, the most suitable leader should be the one with the
greatest expertise in the subject area. Using incentivized elicitation
tasks, we quantify the degree to which capable members were willing to
step forward to lead. Crucially, our experiment design enables us to
demonstrate how their willingness to lead is influenced by a group's
gender composition.
Gender stereotype effect
Over the past two decades, substantial research in psychology has
investigated the effect of stereotype on performance. There are two
strands of theory on this topic: stereotype threat theory and stereotype
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boost theory. Stereotype threat theory predicts that negative stereo-
types hurt performance, while stereotype boost theory predicts that
positive stereotypes will boost performance. Empirical studies of ste-
reotype threat generally find that negative stereotypes undermine
performance of stereotyped individuals (e.g., academic performance, as
well as performance in other domains, including athletic and memory
tasks). Women, individuals with lower socioeconomic status, and the
elderly are often highly detrimentally impacted by stereotype threat (cf.
Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 1998; Chasteen, Kang, & Remedios, 2011;
Croizet & Claire, 1998; Levy, 1996; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999;
Steele & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Sjomeling, Lynch, & Darley, 1999). A
large body of work also shows that activating positive stereotypes can
help boost performance (cf. Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001 for a
review, see Shih et al., 2011 Spencer et al., 1999). Mechanisms thought
to account for stereotype threat and stereotype boost include changes in
stress and anxiety, the mediation in self-efficacy, beliefs about one's
own ability (self-doubt/self-confidence) and changes in neural proces-
sing efficiency (Shih et al., 2011).
Our study focuses on gender stereotypes. Following the stereotype
literature and role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), people ex-
perience gender stereotype threat when performing tasks with char-
acteristics that are incongruent with gender stereotypes about their
social group, namely, tasks that hold negative stereotypes (e.g., women
are unlikely to do well on male stereotyped tasks such as mathematical
tasks). Gender stereotype boost occurs when people perform tasks with
characteristics that are incongruent with gender stereotypes about their
social group, namely, tasks that pertain to positive stereotypes about
the individual (e.g., men are likely to do well on male stereotyped tasks
such as math). In economics, the GSE was demonstrated by Coffman
(2014). The author showed that after controlling for ability, women
(men) are less likely to put their answers forward as the group lead
answers to male (female) stereotyped problems. We expect to observe
evidence of GSE in our study. With our experimental design, we can
determine whether self-efficacy and belief about one's own ability are
key drivers of the GSE.
Gender composition and the activation of GSE
There are a number of ways to make stereotype salient and activate
the GSE. Some researchers have used explicit activation by informing
subjects directly about stereotypes (cf., Spencer et al., 1999). Others
have implemented implicit activation, such as nonconscious priming
(e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) and identity salience manipula-
tions (Ambady, Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001). More recently, however,
new evidence has cast some doubt on the validity of the above-men-
tioned activation methods. For example, Doyen et al. (2012) failed to
replicate Bargh et al. (1996) and cautioned against the use of non-
conscious priming for future research. Flore et al. (2019) did not re-
plicate the findings reported by Ambady et al. (2001) using the identity
salience manipulation. The explicit activation design used in Spencer
et al. (1999) is likely to suffer from the experimenter demand effect
(Zizzo, 2010), resulting confounds in the results. In contrast to the
previous literature, we use the gender composition of groups to activate
gender stereotypes.
Gender composition of groups can implicitly and subtly activate
gender stereotypes, when experimenter demand effect is minimized.
Kanter (1977) proposed a theory of tokenism which suggests that the
relative number of socially and culturally different people in a group
critically shapes a group's interaction dynamics. Notably, the presence
of other group members increases the salience of one's group mem-
bership and the associated group stereotypes to oneself and to others. In
the context of gender, this theory implies that the presence of the op-
posite gender may activate gender stereotypes. Proceeding in the same
spirit, Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2016) introduce an
economic model of stereotypes based on representativeness heuristics.
One key predication of the model is that stereotypes are context
dependent and depend on characteristics of a reference group.
Ample empirical evidence supports the view that gender stereotypes
can be activated through a group's gender composition. In Cohen and
Swim (1995)’s study, individuals in groups that comprised mainly the
opposite gender were more likely to report that they expected to be
stereotyped by their group members than individuals in groups com-
prised mostly of the same gender. Sekaquaptewa and Thompson (2003)
report that the presence of the opposite gender exacerbates the ste-
reotype threat effect, especially for women. Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev
(2000) demonstrate that situational cues, including gender composi-
tion, could activate stereotypes and impact individual performance.
Hoyt et al. (2010) reveal that the consequences from stereotype threat
are more prominent in mixed than single gender groups. In light of this
literature, we anticipate our group's gender composition to activate
GSE. In particular, we predict that GSE is stronger in mixed gender
groups than single gender groups.
Objective performance feedback and the willingness to lead
When the performance quality of an individual is ambiguous and/or
difficult to quantify objectively, research in psychology has demon-
strated that one is often perceived as less preferred and less competent
when performing tasks that are gender-incongruent, thereby resulting
in biased performance evaluations (Eagly et al., 1992; Heilman, Wallen,
& Fuchs, 2004; Heilman & Haynes, 2005; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007;
Heilman & Wallen, 2010; Tosi & Einbender, 1985). Researchers have
proposed the prescribed gender roles and stereotype to be a primary
source of this effect (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Eagly & Karau, 2002;
Heilman, 2001; Heilman & Haynes, 2005; Rudman & Glick, 2001).
However, once objective information on performance is available,
gender stereotype no longer influences the performance evaluation
(Heilman & Haynes, 2005; Tosi & Einbender, 1985). For example, in an
experimental study by Heilman and Haynes (2005), participants
worked in mixed gender dyads where individual contributions to a
teams' success were ambiguous. The authors found that female leaders
were consistently undervalued and viewed as less competent, less ef-
fective and less leader-like compared with their male counterparts,
unless objective individual performance feedback was given. Given that
one is more likely to be rated objectively when individual performance
feedback is available, we expect leaders to anticipate this objective
assessment and exhibit greater willingness to lead. One thing to note,
however, is that much of the above-mentioned research uses tasks that
are not incentivized or tasks with only hypothetical consequences. For
example, common leadership tasks used in the literature involve arti-
ficial scenarios where participants assume a leadership role (see, e.g,
Hoyt et al., 2010). The hypothetical nature of the outcome measures
brings the reliability into question (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). In our
study, all decisions are appropriately incentivized, thereby providing a
more reliable empirical measurement of behaviors. For example, we
measure one's willingness to lead using the position in line the subject
selects. We did not frame the decision using an artificial scenario. In-
stead, we have a fixed rule that implemented a group decision based on
answers from those who expressed the strongest desire to lead.
In the economics literature, objective performance feedback has
been used in different individual decision domains and shown to be
effective in boosting individual performance. For example, Freeman
and Gelber (2010) and Azmat and Iriberri (2010) found that the in-
formation about both one's own and others' relative skill level helped
improve performance. At the same time, there is a large literature on
the effect of audience on behavior (see, for example, Andreoni &
Bernheim, 2009; Charness, Rigotti, & Rustichini, 2007). In our experi-
ment, with a large group size (audience) and complete objective in-
formation about both one's own and other group members' perfor-
mance, we hypothesize that capable players will demonstrate greater
willingness to lead when individual performance feedback information
is available publicly.
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Experimental design and procedures
The primary goal of our experiment is to test whether the gender
composition of a group affects one's willingness to lead through GSE. A
second goal is to test whether public performance feedback helps en-
courage competent players to take the lead, and whether the effect of
public feedback differs according to a group's gender composition. We
focus on groups that comprised four members. We use a 4×2 between-
subject design, where we vary the gender composition (all-male, all-
female, majority male (three males and 1 female) or majority female
(three females and one male)) and whether performance feedback is
public.
We aimed to achieve three goals with our design: 1) to capture the
willingness to lead in a setting where groups must make decisions over
various gender domains; 2) to vary exogenously the reference group/
gender composition; and 3) to vary exogenously whether feedback is
public. To accomplish the first goal, we used a modified version of the
design reported by Coffman (2014). For the second goal, we im-
plemented a procedure (detailed below) with an eye towards mini-
mizing experimenter demand effects. To accomplish the final goal, we
made feedback public and salient using a procedure detailed at the end
of this section.
We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to recruit two-hundred-and-forty-
eight participants (124 male, 124 female) from a volunteer under-
graduate participant pool during May and June 2015. Participants' self-
reported ages ranged from 18 to 34 (Mean = 19.79; SD = 1.88); their
educational background included a broad range of disciplines, in-
cluding physical and natural sciences and humanities and social sci-
ences. We conducted a total of 17 sessions, and each session lasted
around one and a half hours with an average payment of £17, which
was around $38 at the time of the experiment. The participants were
paid based on their decisions alone in the experiment, and no show up
fee was given.
For each of the experimental sessions, we recruited a gender-ba-
lanced sample. We checked subjects in one by one, according to the
order in which they arrived. After check-in, each subject was asked to
draw a number privately from one of two identical bags. One bag in-
cluded only odd-numbered balls and the other only even. As we
checked in the subjects, the male subjects were given the bag with only
odd-numbered balls and the female subjects drew from the bag with
even-numbers. Lab seating was arranged in rows, with each row in-
cluding four stations. We ensured that the subjects sitting in the same
row belonged to the same group, and we told participants that this
arrangement was the case. Finally, at each of the stations there was a
card with the player's ID.
The experiment was computerized using Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and comprised four incentivized parts (Part A, B, C, and D) and a survey
that collected demographic information (screenshots of the experiment
are included in the appendix). All participants received general in-
structions informing them that one part of the experiment had been
preselected for payment and would be announced at the end of the
experiment. They received £1 per point earned on the preselected part.
With the exception of the public feedback treatment, participants re-
ceived no information about their own or others' performance until the
experiment concluded. In Appendix A, we provide further details re-
garding the recruitment process, random group assignment and the
feedback mechanism that guaranteed participants' decision anonymity.
Participants faced multiple-choice questions from six categories:
arts and literature (Art), entertainment and pop culture (Pop), en-
vironmental science (Env), history (Hist), geography (Geo), and sports
and games (Sports). Each question included five possible answers and
was labeled with its corresponding category (see Fig. 1). Those six ca-
tegories vary in their perceived gender stereotypeness.
Part A: Individual task
Participants answered 30 multiple-choice questions (5 from each
category) on their own. The data from this part provided us with a
baseline measurement of individual ability for each category. Subjects
received 1 point for each correct answer.
Part B: Willingness to lead in a group
a) Group gender composition revelation
As the subjects proceeded to part B, they were informed that they
would be working with other participants as a group for this part
and that they were sitting in the same row as their group members.
The experimenter verbally encouraged the subjects to look left and
right to observe their group members. Afterwards, participants
made decisions about how willing they were to contribute their
answers to a new set of questions.
b) Willingness to lead – group task
The subjects made two decisions for each of the new 30 multiple
choice questions (see Fig. 2): 1) their answer to the question; and 2)
their willingness to lead the group (in other words, put their answer
as the group answer by selecting the position in line they would like
to stand in the group of four). Since there are four members in the
group, there are also four positions in line. Position 1 corresponds to
first in line to submit one's own answer as the group answer, posi-
tion 2 corresponds to second in line to submit one's own answer as
the group answer, position 3 corresponds to third in line to submit
one's answer as the group answer, and so on.
Among the four group members, the participant who selected the
lowest number—the position closest to the front of the line—would
have his/her answer submitted as the group's answer. If multiple
members selected the same lowest position in line, the computer ran-
domly selected one member's answer as the group answer. The lower the
position in line, the more willing the subject was to lead their group.
The payment for this task depended on the submitted group answers.
Each group member received 1 point for each correct answer and lost a
quarter point for each incorrect answer.
Immediately after subjects checked their group members, and be-
fore they started answering a new set of questions (and before public
feedback for those in that treatment), they were asked to make in-
centivized guesses about their own rank within the newly formed group
for each of the categories from Part A. They receive additional 25 pence
for each correct guess. The purpose of this rank data is to enable insight
regarding the effect of group gender composition on self-confidence and
to help explain subsequent group task decisions.
Part C and D: Self and group confidence elicitation, risk elicitation
In Part C, we measured participants' confidence in their own an-
swers, as well as in the average answers of their group members.
Participants were given the same questions from Part B again, and were
asked in an incentive-compatible way (a simplified Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak method) to estimate the probability that their own answer
was correct and the probability that their group members' answers were
correct2. Specifically, subjects made three decisions for each question:
1) provide an answer; 2) indicate the probability of their own answer
being correct with a number between 1 and 100 – a measure of con-
fidence in one's own answer for question i; and 3) provide an estimate
2 This belief elicitation mechanism is widely used, and its theoretical prop-
erties have been studied by Karni (2009), Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and
Rosenblat (2011) and Schlag, Tremewan, and van der Weele (2015), among
others. Under this mechanism, participants are incentivized to provide true
beliefs. Appendices A1-A3 provide detailed experimental instructions.
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of the probability of the other group members' answer being correct—a
measure of confidence in other groups members' answer for question i.
A correct answer earned half a point, and incorrect answers earned
nothing (Fig. 3).
In Part D, we elicited subjects' risk attitudes and asked for demo-
graphic and attitudinal information, including, for example, gender,
age, where they attended high school, and which question categories
they liked or disliked. For this last question, we asked subjects to
evaluate the male- or female-typeness of each category. For each of the
categories, the subjects were asked to indicate their answers using a
slider bar ranging from −1 to 1, where −1 was labeled as “women
know more,” 1 was labeled “men know more,” and the center of the
slider bar indicated no gender difference.
Public feedback treatments
Recall that we used a 4×2 between-subject design, varying the
gender composition of the group and the availability of public feed-
back. In the feedback treatments, each participant received an addi-
tional page informing her of her Part A performance in each category.
In this performance feedback page, the subjects were able to see their
own rank, as well as the player ID of the best performer in their group
(if the best performer was not them). In the case where the participant
happened to be the best performer for the category, instead of her own
player ID, the word “You” was boldly displayed in the best performer
column. Notice that we informed the subjects about how they and the
others in their group performed prior to the group task. The best players
knew that their group members also received and acknowledged the
fact that they were the best players for the category. Given that player
ID was sequential in the group, one could easily know the seating po-
sition of the best player in the group.
Knowing the seating position of the group's top performer could
seem to impinge on anonymity, potentially opening the possibility that
decisions in the lab could have implications for outcomes outside the
lab. To the extent that there might be a concern for anonymity, we
would argue that this experimental design choice is an ecologically
valid feature of our experiment. The reason is that, for most real-life
settings, the performance of group members can usually be identified,
at least partially. As a result, our design may better approximate the
real-world scenario on which we ultimately aim to inform.
That said, as emphasized in Appendix A, it is highly unlikely that
any participant's decisions could have implications outside the lab.
Reasons are that participants in the lab are generally strangers, and
even if friends join the experiment, the chance that they would be
randomly assigned to the same group is small. Consequently, partici-
pants are unlikely to interact with each other outside the lab. Perhaps
more importantly, the public “best performer” information is dis-
connected from earnings. Recall that earnings are based on one ran-
domly selected part of the experiment, and with only 1 4 chance is this
Fig. 1. An example question from Part A of the experiment.
Fig. 2. An example question from Part B of the experiment.
Fig. 3. An example question from Part C of the experiment.
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part related to “Public” information. Further, earnings are based on
answers put forward, and the fact that a person was a best performer
does not immediately imply that their answers were chosen as the
group's answers. Consequently, even in the Public treatment, it is not
possible to assign praise or blame for one's earnings to any specific
individual.
Predictions
We hypothesize that the gender composition of a group moderates
one's willingness to lead a group through GSE, holding ability constant.
As a result, some equally (or more highly) capable members may hold
back from leading the team and let others take the lead instead. The
stepping-back by capable members may result in reduced quality of
ideas advanced by the group. Consequently, a group's overall perfor-
mance can be negatively affected. We detail this hypothesis below.
Conjecture 1. GSE is stronger in mixed gender groups than single gender
groups.
Following the theory proposed by Kanter (1977) and Bordalo et al.
(2016), as well as the literature reviewed in Gender composition and
the activation of GSE section, mixed gender groups are likely to activate
the gender stereotype, while single gender groups lack the other gender
as a comparison group and are thus less likely to activate gender ste-
reotype. Further, one's own gender and the corresponding gender ste-
reotype are more likely to be salient and activated in mixed than in
single gender groups. Hence GSE is expected to be stronger for subjects
in mixed than single gender groups.
Conjecture 2. The average quality of group ideas is lower in mixed gender
groups than single gender groups. Differences in the quality of contributed
group ideas account for group performance differences.
Following Conjecture 1, women/men in mixed gender groups are
more likely to suffer from GSE than those in single gender groups. This
conjecture implies that equally capable women or men are more likely
to lead teams and offer qualified ideas to both male and female ste-
reotyped tasks when they are placed in a single gender group. In con-
trast, equally capable women (men) may shy away from leading male
(female) typed tasks when placed in a mixed gender group. As a result,
we expect higher quality ideas from single gender than mixed gender
groups. As the submitted group ideas determine group performance, we
expect group performance variation can be explained by the quality of a
group's ideas.
Conjecture 3. Public feedback increases the willingness of high-ability
players to take the lead.
In the public feedback treatments, subjects received public in-
formation about both their own and other group members' perfor-
mance. They were able to see their own rank, as well as the player ID
associated with the best performer (if the best performer was not self) in
her group. In view of the literature reviewed in Objective performance
feedback and the willingness to lead section, we hypothesize that the
best players are more likely to lead their groups if they are in the public
feedback treatments.
Results
Overview and summary statistics
Table 1 below shows the average number of questions answered
correctly in Part A (individual task) and B (group task) by gender. For
both Part A and B, performance did not differ significantly between
men and women for any of the groups with varying gender composi-
tion. Overall, men performed significantly better than women. In the
analyses that follow, we use the data from Part A to control for general
individual ability differences. We also control for whether one an-
swered a specific question correctly in Part B. Additionally, we tested
whether the average number of correct answers for a group as a whole
changed significantly from Part A to Part B. We do not find statistically
significant changes at 5% significance level. It suggests that average
group ability did not change due to revelation of group gender com-
position.
Recall that we collected data from our subjects at the end of the
experiment (before they received any feedback on their performance)
regarding their perception of the gender stereotypeness of each of the
categories. The perceived gender stereotypeness did not differ by
treatment groups. As a result, we report pooled results in Table 2. Arts &
Literature and Entertainment & Pop Culture were considered more fe-
male-typed, whereas Sports & Games, Geography and History were
regarded as more male-typed. Environmental science was viewed as
gender-neutral. Men and women generally agreed on the direction of
the stereotypeness of the category. However, they disagreed about the
magnitude.
Fig. 4 presents the raw data: average place in line chosen by women
and men in Part B by category and treatment. The categories are ar-
ranged in increasing order of perceived maleness: Art and Literature
(Art) is the least male-typed category and Sports and Game (Spts) the
most male-typed category. As the maleness of the category increases,
women are less willing to lead the group (the more male-typed the
category, the further back women place themselves in line, as revealed
by the positive slope of the fitted line), whereas men are more willing to
lead (the more male-typed the category, the further up men place
themselves in line, as revealed by the negative slope of the fitted line).
Both men and women were less likely to vary their positions in line
according to the stereotypeness of the category in single gender groups
than mixed gender groups. This observation is indicated by a flatter
slope of the best-fit line for single than mixed gender groups for both
genders. Recall that the position in line was also determined by ability
Table 1
Part A & B performance by gender and treatment groups.
Group composition Number of questions correct P value
(H0 : M=W)
N
Men Women
Part A
All female 14.22 32
All male 15.50 0.11 32
Female majority 14.78 14.16 0.44 92
Male majority 16.09 15.78 0.71 92
15.69 14.48 0.003 248
Part B
All female 14.97 32
All male 16.44 0.07 32
Female majority 15.30 13.77 0.11 92
Male majority 15.70 15.96 0.78 92
15.81 14.48 0.004 248
Note: P values are from Fisher-Pitman permutation tests for non-binary vari-
ables, with a null of equality of distributions between men and women.
Table 2
Perceived gender stereotype of categories.
Category Avg. maleness Overall Avg. Normalized
z score
By men By women
Art & Literature −.310 −.386 −.348 −1.189
Entertainment & Pop Culture −.214 −.253 −.233 −.833
Env. Sci. .063 −.001 .031 −.007
History .097 .069 .083 .155
Geography .137 .051 .095 .191
Sports & Games .612 .532 .573 1.683
Note: The elicitation is on the scale of −1 (female knows more) to 1 (male
knows more). The more positive the number, the more male-stereotyped the
category, and more negative indicates more female.
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(described by Table 1) as well as one's perceived gender stereotypeness
of the category (described by Table 2). We control for those factors in
the next section.
Main results
Evidence of gender stereotype effect
Table 3 Regression (1) reports the first evidence on GSE. We regress
a participant's chosen position in line for question i on gender (Female
Dummy), the z-score of reported “maleness” of the category from which
question i is drawn (Maleness of Category), the interaction of gender and
“maleness” score (Female x Maleness). For robustness checks, we also
include a standard set of controls in Regression (2). Some of the controls
are used throughout the analyses reported in this paper: whether or not
one answered question i correctly (Answered Qn. i Correctly – a proxy for
her question-specific ability) and her Part A score in the category from
which question i was drawn (Part A Score – a proxy for her broader
ability in that specific category), dummies for the treatments, race
dummies, a dummy for attending secondary school in the UK, and the
overall probability of a correct answer for question i3 in Part B. Errors
are clustered at the individual level. Because the dependent variable is
the position in line, lower coefficient estimates indicate a greater
willingness to contribute.
We find that as the maleness of the category increased, men became
significantly more likely to lead the group (demonstrated by the sig-
nificantly negative coefficient of Maleness of Category, p< .01), when
holding ability constant. Women, in comparison, became significantly
less likely to lead as the maleness of the category increased (shown by
the significantly positive sum of the coefficients of Maleness of Category
and Female x Maleness, p< .01). Our results are qualitatively similar to
those of Coffman (2014); however, the size of the effect in our data is
more than twice the level she reports.
Evidence of gender composition moderating GSE
The analysis in Table 3 (1) and (2) above establishes that men re-
spond to increased maleness of the category with increased leadership,
and women respond to increased femaleness of the category (or de-
creased maleness of the category) by doing the same. That is, both men
and women show GSE when pooling all treatments, and holding ability
constant. We now turn to our key question: does the gender composi-
tion of a group moderate the observed GSE? The answer is yes.
In Table 3 Regression (3), we include additional regressors: the in-
teraction of the maleness score and a dummy for mixed gender treat-
ment (Maleness x Mixed Gender) and the interaction of the gender
dummy, the maleness score and the mixed gender group dummy (Fe-
male x Maleness x Mixed Gender). It is clear that men in an all-male
group do not exhibit GSE: their willingness to lead does not differ by the
maleness of the category (demonstrated by the statistically insignificant
coefficient of Maleness of Category, p = 0.22). In contrast, men do
display GSE in mixed gender groups as shown by the significantly po-
sitive sum of the coefficients of Maleness of Category and Maleness x
Mixed Gender, p< .01. The effect in mixed gender groups is not only
highly significant, but the size is also large in magnitude. Unlike men,
women exhibit GSE even in women-only groups: women are less likely
to lead when the maleness of the category increases (shown by the sig-
nificantly positive sum of the coefficients of Maleness of Category and
Female x Maleness, p< .01). Moreover, the size of GSE almost doubles,
when women are placed in a mixed gender group (shown by the sig-
nificant coefficient of Female x Maleness x Mixed Gender, p< .01). With
additional controls in Table 3 Regression (4), our results hold. Further
Fig. 4. Average position in line by gender and treatment. Note: Error bar = mean± standard error of the mean. The category is ranked by increasing perceived
maleness of the category. Lower position number indicates a greater willingness to lead the group.
Table 3
OLS predicting position in line for Question i in Part B - Willingness to lead.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Dummy 0.152*** 0.057 0.150*** 0.055
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Maleness of category −0.403*** −0.368*** −0.165 −0.169
(0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.10)
Female x Maleness 0.832*** 0.709*** 0.480*** 0.368***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.17) (0.14)
Maleness x Mixed gender −0.327** −0.273**
(0.15) (0.12)
Female x Maleness
x Mixed gender
0.493** 0.480***
(0.20) (0.17)
Constant 2.533*** 4.128*** 2.533*** 4.126***
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.13)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 7440 7440 7440 7440
R2 0.028 0.309 0.030 0.310
Notes: Lower position in line indicated greater willingness to lead. The unit of
observation is question i. Each participant in the experiment answered 30
questions. Cluster-robust standard errors at individual level were used in the
regressions (248 clusters in total). Controls include a dummy for whether
question i was answered correctly, Part A score for the category, race dummy,
UK secondary school dummy, and the overall probability of a correct answer for
question i in Part B.
* Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
3 This is calculated as the percentage of subjects who answer the question i
correctly. This variable controls the overall difficulty of the question.
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investigation indicates that the results reported above are also not
driven by any of the mixed gender groups. In fact, GSE occurs with even
one member of the opposite gender present (see Appendix Tables A1
and A2).
In sum, we conclude that the presence of the opposite gender sig-
nificantly activates GSE, while the absence of the opposite gender in a
group mitigates this effect. Further, men seem not to display GSE when
women are absent. An implication is that we should observe higher
overall percentages of 1st in line answers in single as opposed to mixed
gender groups. The reason is that as GSE dials down for single gender
groups, equally capable players from both genders are equally likely to
lead in all gendered domains. As we discuss further in later sections, the
percentage of 1st in line answers is critical for group performance.
Gender composition moderates the GSE – mechanism through beliefs
In this section, we provide evidence that gender composition of a
group may change one's belief about her own standing in the group, and
the changes in beliefs in turn impact GSE. Recall that immediately after
the random group assignment and prior to Part B, we asked our parti-
cipants to guess their ranking in the newly formed group for each of the
six categories from Part A.
In Table 4, we show that controlling for Part A performance (own
ability), people perceived their own group ranking very differently
depending on the gender composition of their randomly assigned
group. We regress one's perceived group rank for category i with a
gender dummy (Female Dummy), the absolute value of one's reported
“maleness” z-score of the category i (Stereotypeness), the interaction of
Stereotypeness and a mixed gender group dummy, the number of ques-
tions answered correctly for category i and other standard controls re-
ported in the previous analyses. The coefficient of Stereotypeness mea-
sures how one's perception of her group ranking for category i changes
according to the level of gender-congruence of that category. The nega-
tive sign of the coefficient means that the more gender-congruent the
category is, the higher one ranks herself in the group. The more nega-
tive the coefficient, the greater the effect the stereotypes have on her
belief about her standing in the group.
Consistent with the results from the previous section, we find that,
holding ability constant, beliefs systematically vary according to the
gender-congruence of the category, and that this effect is greater in
mixed than single gender groups. Indeed, men in single gender groups
did not vary their group rank beliefs with the stereotypeness of the
category (for details see appendix Table A3). Further, group gender
composition manipulation does not impact beliefs over average ability
of other group members (see appendix, Table A4).
Overall group performance analyses
We next consider overall group performance across different treat-
ments. We demonstrated in the previous section that a group's gender
composition moderates people's willingness to lead, particularly in a
gender-incongruent domain. People in single gender groups are more
likely to lead in all areas than mixed gender groups, holding ability
constant. As a result, groups with different gender compositions may
have different fractions of 1st in line answers contributed as group
answers. Moreover, the fraction of 1st in line answers may help to ex-
plain differences in overall group performance. Table 5 below sum-
marizes performance results by treatment. All-Male and Majority-Male
groups performed significantly better than Majority-Female groups
(p< .01). About 62% of the submitted group answers for All-Male and
Majority-Male groups were from the 1st in line, whereas only 53% of
the group answers in All-Female and Majority-Female groups were from
1st in line answers4.
As shown in the regression analyses in Table 6, the fraction of 1st in
line answers is a highly significant predictor for group performances
(Table 6, Regression 1), even after controlling for the average ability of
the group, which we denote as Group Part B Score (Table 6, Regression
2). Further, the group performance differences (as shown in Table 6,
Regression 4) disappear when we control for the percentage of answers
from 1st in line and average group ability (Table 6, Regression 3).
The percentage of answers from 1st in line were of great im-
portance, as detailed in Table 7. Answers from 1st in line were about
89% accurate, but the accuracy rate drops to 57% if the answers are
from 2nd in line. Given the position in line, we do not find gender
differences with regard to the rate of accuracy. However, Table 8 shows
that, conditional on having correct answers, men were significantly
more likely than women to choose to lead. The implication is that
capable female players were not realizing their full potential by leading
the group. We also observe that conditional on an incorrect answer,
men were more likely to try to lead by placing themselves at least third
in line. Doing this, however, had little negative impact on group per-
formance. The reason is that it was rarely the case that answers from
3rd in line were used as the group answer.
We now turn to the public feedback conditions in order to in-
vestigate whether this encourages high ability players, and especially
high ability women, to choose to lead.
Effect of public feedback on the best players
Recall that in our public feedback treatment we provided players
with information about their own rank, as well as the ID of the best
player in their group. In Table 9, we regressed participants' chosen
Table 4
OLS predicting Part A Belief in group ranking - Impact of group composition
and effect of stereotypes.
Single gender Mixed gender Pooled
(1) (2) (3)
Female Dummy 0.160 0.230*** 0.223***
(0.11) (0.07) (0.06)
Stereotypeness −0.276** −0.598*** −0.272**
(0.14) (0.07) (0.14)
Stereotypeness
x Mixed gender group
−0.323**
(0.15)
Part A Score - Same category −0.121*** −0.104*** −0.109***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 2.984*** 2.603*** 2.830***
(0.20) (0.10) (0.10)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 384 1104 1488
R2 0.089 0.152 0.136
Notes: Lower number in ranking indicated greater confidence. The unit of ob-
servation is category i. Each participant in the experiment reported ranking
belief for 6 categories. Cluster-robust standard errors at individual level were
used in the regressions. Controls include race dummy, UK secondary school
dummy. Standard errors are clustered at individual level.
* Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 5
Part B Group performance by Group composition.
Group composition Avg. performance
(in points)
% of Answers
from 1st in line
N
All male 19.69 63% 8
(0.77)
Male majority 18.04 61% 23
(0.82)
All female 16.09 50% 8
(1.12)
Female majority 15.54 56% 23
(0.72)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
4 For all groups, around 30% of the answers were from 2nd in line. A very
small fraction of the answers was from 3rd or 4th in line.
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position in line for question i with the regressors used in previous
analyses, and an additional set of Feedback regressors. Here, Feedback is
a dummy indicating whether a participant is in public feedback treat-
ment. Female x Feedback is an interaction term that measures whether
the effect of feedback on women is different than the effect on men. As a
result, the coefficient of Feedback indicates the effect of feedback on
men, and the sum of Feedback and Female x Feedback represents the total
effect of feedback on women. Overall, we find strong evidence that
public feedback encourages the best female players to take the lead (F
test for H0: Feedback + Female x Feedback = 0, p< .01), as shown in
Table 12 (1) pooled analyses. We also included interaction terms re-
garding feedback and the maleness of the category. None of those in-
teraction terms were statistically significant. Detailed tables are in-
cluded in the appendix, Table A4.
It is interesting to note that the effect of feedback depends on the
gender composition of the group. In single gender groups, the high-
ability men and women were both significantly affected by public
feedback. On the one hand, the best male players in an all-male group
responded significantly positively to feedback by leading more. Indeed,
they moved up in the line by about 12%5. On the other hand, the best
female players were deterred by public feedback and responded by
taking a step back (possible explanations for this finding are offered in
the following section). In mixed gender groups, the best male players
did not seem to be affected by the feedback, while the best female
players responded positively by leading the group more (p< .01 for
both Majority-Female and Majority-Male groups). We did not observe
an interaction effect between feedback and the gender stereotype of the
category, in other words, the effect of the feedback did not differ by the
maleness of the category. Detailed regressions are reported in the ap-
pendix, Table A4.
Discussion
In this paper, we find that a group's gender composition sig-
nificantly moderates GSE. In particular, participating in a mixed gender
group (even as the majority gender) substantially increases the impact
of GSE, while being in a single-gender group diminishes (and for men
eliminates) this effect. Consequently, capable members of groups with
mixed gender compositions choose whether to lead and contribute
differently. Moreover, we show that group performance differences can
be largely explained by the fraction of capable players who choose to
lead. Additionally, we find that public revelation of objective perfor-
mance increases the chance that men in all-male groups will prefer to
take the lead; surprisingly, however, this public revelation has the op-
posite effect for women in all-female groups—capable women are de-
terred from leading under public revelation. In mixed gender groups,
however, public feedback significantly encourages the best female
players to lead. So far, we have left open the possible channels that the
presence of the opposite gender may activate GSE. In the next subsec-
tion, we discuss the possible channels and the existing evidence.
Possible channels for activation of GSE
There are two channels through which the presence of the opposite
gender may activate GSE. If women believe that their male team
members are relatively better at male-typed tasks and worse at female-
typed tasks holding ability constant, then they will choose to step back
in male-typed tasks and step up in female-typed tasks. We refer to this
channel as the gender comparative advantage channel. It follows that
the presence of the opposite gender activates GSE, since there is a group
with comparative advantage. We anticipate GSE to disappear in single
gender groups (no one in the group has a particular comparative ad-
vantage) and reappear in mixed gender groups. Alternatively, if women
simply believe they are less capable at male-typed tasks per se, then
they will step back in male-typed tasks, even when there is no male
presence. We call this channel the gender identity channel. Under the
identity channel, we predict that GSE can impact behavior even in
single gender groups. Moreover, because gender identity is salient in
mixed-gender groups, under this channel GSE is stronger in mixed than
single gender groups.
We find that men suffer from GSE in mixed but not single gender
groups, whereas women experience GSE in both types of groups. This
finding suggests that GSE is more likely to operate through the gender
comparative advantage channel for men, but through the gender
identify channel for women.
Discussion of the results and implications
Gender diversity has been the focus of many public-policy debates,
Table 6
OLS on group performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of 1st in line
answers
15.761*** 8.038*** 7.707**
(3.59) (2.39) (2.89)
Group Part B score 1.353*** 1.301***
(0.12) (0.13)
All female 0.181 0.550
(1.11) (1.30)
All male 0.835 4.144***
(0.93) (1.04)
Male majority 0.444 2.500**
(0.72) (1.10)
Constant 7.967*** −8.067*** −7.390*** 15.543***
(2.07) (1.83) (1.99) (0.728)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R2 0.225 0.668 0.673 0.163
Notes: The unit of observation is group i. There were 62 groups in total in the
experiment. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The control
group is the female majority group.
* Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 7
Part B Accuracy by position in line.
Position in line Answer accuracy rate P value (H0 : M=W) N
Men Women
1st In line 89% 88% 0.84 1934
2nd In line 57% 54% 0.39 1405
3rd In line 40% 36% 0.09 1836
4th In line 24% 27% 0.13 2265
Notes: P values are from regressions with accuracy rate as the dependent vari-
able and gender dummy as the independent variable. The unit of observation is
question i. Cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level were used.
Table 8
Part B Average position in line by gender.
Average position in line Men Women P value (H0 : M=W) N
Correct answers 1.95 2.13 0.00 3757
(0.04) (0.05)
Incorrect answers 3.12 3.21 0.16 3683
(0.04) (0.06)
Notes: P values are from regressions with position in line as the dependent
variable and gender dummy as the independent variable. The unit of ob-
servation is question i. Cluster-robust standard errors at the individual levels are
reported in parentheses.
5 The overall average position in line is about 2.5, the increase of the position
in line for best male players in all-male groups is 0.304, about a 12% increase.
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with special attention paid to gender diversity in the high-tech industry.
Yet it is far from clear how gender diversity impacts group economic
performance, and through which channels it operates. We move to-
wards answering this question by exploring whether gender composi-
tion may affect group performance by impacting the willingness to lead
of those most capable.
Using groups of four, we observed that both men and women are
less likely to take the lead on problems outside of their own gender-
stereotyped domain. Further, we found that a group's gender compo-
sition moderates this effect. Specifically, both women and men placed
in single gender groups were at least 50% less likely to experience the
gender stereotype effect than when placed in mixed gender groups. While
GSE vanished for men in all-male groups, women continued to display
this effect even when placed in all-female groups (though it was sub-
stantially mitigated). A crucial implication is that GSE may operate
through different channels for men and women, particularly the
channels of gender comparative advantage for men, and gender identity
for women.
We observed that GSE can be explained by changes in beliefs. For
example, we found that a woman ’s belief about her ability ranking
within a group is dramatically impacted by a group's gender composi-
tion. Importantly, the direction of her change in beliefs is consistent
with the impact of GSE. One reason that women display GSE even in all-
female groups may be that gender identity is deeply rooted for women,
and the presence of a man may not be needed to remind a woman of her
femaleness. There is much evidence for this finding, including, e.g., that
females are more susceptible than males to gender-stereotyped pre-
scriptions of appropriate social behavior (Burgess & Borgida, 1999;
Heilman et al., 2004; Rudman & Glick, 2001). As a result, special at-
tention should be paid to female leaders, since women may be more
susceptible to gender stereotype threats than men (Kiefer &
Sekaquaptewa, 2007). Indeed, Karpowitz, Monson, and Preece (2017)
demonstrate that a simple verbal message intervention from party
leaders can significantly encourage women to run and ultimately win
positions as precinct leaders.
A closer look at overall group performance reveals that the key to
group success is to have more answers from the 1st in line (i.e., for
capable players to lead the group), as 1st in line answers have the
highest accuracy rate. Moreover, the fraction of 1st in line answers is
influenced by the gender composition of the group. We demonstrated
that gender composition moderates people's willingness to lead the
groups and further influence the overall group performances. We also
found that conditional on a correct answer, men were significantly
more likely than women to take the lead. The implication is that there
are missed opportunities from capable female players. Consequently,
we investigated whether it might improve the efficiency of group de-
cision-making to provide public feedback to participants by providing
not only their own group rank (relative performance), but also the ID of
the best player in their group. Overall, this intervention successfully
resulted in greater numbers of high-ability female leaders.
Further, we found the effect of public feedback to vary according to
the gender composition of the group. In single gender groups, the best
male players responded to positive feedback by leading more, whereas
the best female players seemed to be deterred from taking control of the
group. One explanation for this observation could be that women care
more about fairness and would like to signal their cooperativeness by
letting others shine as well (see, e.g., Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001;
Charness & Rustichini, 2011). Alternatively, women in all-female
groups may believe that promoting themselves, and outshining all other
women, could lead her to be shunned by other group members
(Rudman, 1998). Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) offer evidence to sup-
port this finding. They find girls in all-female racing groups performed
worse than girls in mixed gender competitions. In a similar spirit, we
found that the best female players responded to positive feedback by
taking the lead more in mixed gender groups.
Our results connect to the findings of Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund,
and Weingart (2017). Those authors show that women in gender-di-
verse environments are more likely than men to accept jobs with low
probabilities of promotion. In particular, they find that in single gender
groups, men and women are equally likely to volunteer, but only in
Table 9
OLS predicting position in line for Question i in Part B - Impact of feedback for players with best Part B score in category.
Pooled All female Female maj. Male maj. All male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Dummy 0.115** 0.288*** 0.172*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10)
Maleness of category −0.370*** 0.389*** −0.551*** −0.455*** −0.068
(0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09)
Female x Maleness 0.779*** 1.007*** 0.812***
(0.06) (0.13) (0.12)
Feedback −0.068 0.192** −0.012 0.023 −0.315***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
Female x Feedback −0.041 −0.109 −0.235**
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12)
Answered Qn. i Correctly −0.784*** −0.685*** −0.735*** −0.772*** −0.990***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Part A Score - Same category −0.036*** −0.119*** −0.021** −0.032*** −0.065***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 4.285*** 5.225*** 3.852*** 4.029*** 4.775***
(0.11) (0.38) (0.18) (0.19) (0.24)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4950 510 1890 1920 630
R2 0.305 0.392 0.302 0.292 0.389
Notes: Lower position in line indicated greater willingness to lead. The unit of observation is question i. Each participant in the experiment answered 30 questions.
Cluster-robust standard errors at individual level were used in the regressions (248 clusters in total). Controls include treatment dummies, race dummy, UK secondary
school dummy, the overall probability of a correct answer for question i in Part B.
*Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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mixed gender groups do women volunteer more than men. This beha-
vior is consistent with our findings to the extent that volunteering is a
female-stereotyped domain. Our results are also in line with Born,
Ranehill, and Sandberg (2018). Born and coauthors find that women
are less willing to lead in teams that mainly comprised of men. Finally,
our data provide support for institutional policies that encourage
women and men to lead and not to shy away from success, especially in
gender-incongruent fields.
Our findings have especially important implications for team for-
mation in gendered industries (e.g., the tech sector) as compared to
more traditionally gender-neutral industries (such as Media and
Entertainment). We find GSE to be exacerbated by the presence of even
one person from the opposite gender; thus, women who work in gen-
dered industries should be especially encouraged to avoid shying away
from leadership opportunities, as doing so may result in their being
overlooked for promotion or advancement opportunities.
Furthermore, as numerous studies have shown, ambiguous perfor-
mance metrics lead to biased performance evaluations, particularly for
women performing male-typed tasks (see, e.g., Heilman et al., 2004;
Heilman & Haynes, 2005). Biased evaluations may in turn lead to fewer
women pursuing traditionally male roles, and particularly leadership
roles. The reason is that the quality of leadership is difficult to measure,
and women may in turn expect to receive disproportionately less credit
for success and generally less favorable performance evaluations.
However, our study suggests that public performance feedback may
work to address this concern. Examples of approaches organizations
might pursue include publicizing numbers of sales and corresponding
revenues, the numbers of projects successfully completed, or even, in
academics, the numbers and placements of papers published or grants
awarded. It seems simple to implement such policies, and our results
suggest that doing so may mitigate the GSE and help encourage the
most capable women to choose to lead.
Limitations and future research
Although there are many unique and important aspects to our
findings, there is little question that the methodology we used in our
research limits the degree to which we can extrapolate to natural en-
vironments. Our study used undergraduates as participants and, al-
though the majority of them had work experience, the type of work
experience may be limited and correspondingly limit our ability to
generalize from our data. Future research using different participant
pools, such as MBA students, may offer additional validation and in-
sight for our findings. Further, the current experimental group work
paradigm is suitable for the university student population, as multiple-
choice questions are common tasks. However, this paradigm may not be
appropriate for other participant pools, such as employees in large or-
ganizations. Future research with these participants may require cor-
responding design adaptations. Finally, it would be beneficial to study
the willingness to lead and test the effect of public performance feed-
back in a natural field setting using non-experimental methods.
Willingness to lead could be proxied with the data on people who ask
for a promotion. One form of public feedback could be the employee
recognition awards many companies implement. One could test whe-
ther the recognition award increases women's probability of subse-
quently asking for a promotion. Given the endogeneity issue associated
with the data, one might wish to apply the regression discontinuity
design by comparing employees with a set of similar characteristics
who are runners-up for employee recognition awards.
We find that public performance feedback greatly encourages cap-
able women to step up and take the lead, even for tasks that are ste-
reotyped as existing in the male domain. While we recognize that ob-
jective and public feedback may be difficult to implement in practice,
especially given that objective performance may not be readily avail-
able in some environments that require leadership, alternative public
feedback such as achievements in training or certification may be
provided as evidence of competence for high ability individuals. Our
study mainly addresses the instrumental leadership where organiza-
tions rely on the leader's expertise. Whether our results can extend to
other forms of leadership is still an open question for future research.
Finally, we focus on gender stereotypes as the main mediator for one's
willingness to lead. It is possible that mate selection as posited by
evolution theorist may offer some alternative explanations to some of
our observed gender differences, because different strategies would
have benefitted men versus women in our distant ancestral past ( cf.,
Davies & Shackelford, 2008). Future research may be able to address
this possibility.
Conclusion
The value and importance of gender diversity in organizations is
well-understood. Nonetheless, public policy debates continue regarding
how best to achieve this diversity. These debates can be informed, and
policy advice strengthened, by improving our knowledge about the
channels through which diversity impacts economic outcomes. This
paper is an effort to address this issue. We discovered that, through the
gender stereotype effect, gender composition affects group performance
by impacting the most capable members' willingness to lead.
Importantly, we found that both genders are more likely to experience
the gender stereotype effect and shy away from leadership in gender-
incongruent fields when the workplace is gender diverse. Single-gen-
dered workplaces are not a solution, as women, in particular, continue
to suffer from GSE even in the absence of men. Our evidence suggests
that the most capable female and male leaders emerge, and conse-
quently the best group outcomes are obtained, when public perfor-
mance feedback is provided to mixed-gender groups. This policy is both
highly beneficial and often straightforward to implement, meaning it
should be of great value to any economic or social organization. It is
also worth cautioning that there is greater heterogeneity in tasks people
perform in certain industries, thereby making it challenging to make
comparisons.
Appendix A. Steps taken to help ensure participants' anonymity
A.1. Recruitment details for experimental sessions
Our ORSEE recruitment system includes over 1500 registered participants. The pool is refreshed at the start of every academic year to minimize
the number of the inactive subjects. All accounts are made inactive at the start of the academic year, and subjects are required to reactivate their
accounts themselves. All incoming students also receive invitations to join the pool. The pool includes students from 35 different disciplines, over
200 degree programs and spans across four stages of study.
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For each experimental session, invitation emails were sent to a randomly selected subset of the subject pool. Only those who accepted the session
invitation were able to participate in any particular experimental session. For the experiments reported above, we only used 248 out of over 1500
potential subjects (less than 20% of the total available subjects' pool). Therefore, given the 1500 subjects in the recruiting pool, it is very unlikely to
have subjects from the same discipline, same program and year (those subjects are mostly likely to know each other outside of the laboratory) in the
same experimental session.
A.2. Random assignment of the groups
Our experimental sessions included 16 subjects in groups of four, and at the start of the experiment, every subject drew a random number which
determined their group. Consequently, even in cases where some participants were in the same discipline, same program, same year and might know
each other, the probability of those subjects being put into the same group was only about 25%.
A.3. Feedback and payment mechanism
Subjects were given very limited feedback during the experiment. They did not know about their overall group performance in the majority of the
cases. There were four incentivized parts in the experiment, but only one of those parts was randomly selected for payment. The subjects did not
receive any feedback during the experiment (with the exception of the public feedback treatment where the subjects were only informed how well
each group member performed in the experiment's previous part). At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed about which part was chosen
for payment and the amount they earned for that part. No feedback was given for parts not selected for payment. For example, if Part A was selected
for payment, the subjects would be paid according to their individual performance in Part A, and they would be able to infer how well they did in
Part A. However, they would not learn how well they or their group did in Parts B, C or D. As a result, only around 25% of the groups might have
learned how well their group performed.
Even in those cases where they were able to learn their group's performance, there was no information that could be used by participants to
attribute praise or blame to any specific group member. Note that the overall group performance is determined by the submitted group answers. The
subjects were not informed of whose answers were submitted as group answers. As a result, it was impossible for any subject to assign praise or
blame to any specific person, and thus they were unable to reward or punish outside (or inside) of the laboratory.
Table A1
OLS predicting Part A Belief in group ranking - Impact of group composition on male.
All male Majority male Minority male
(1) (2) (3)
Maleness of category −0.175 −0.540*** −1.216***
(0.20) (0.09) (0.20)
Part A Score in category −0.087 −0.092** −0.047
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Constant 3.020*** 2.736*** 2.524***
(0.33) (0.14) (0.28)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 192 414 138
R2 0.069 0.143 0.260
Note: Lower number in ranking indicated greater confidence. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. Controls include race dummy, UK
secondary school dummy.
* Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table A2
OLS predicting Part A Belief in group ranking - Impact of group composition on female.
All female Majority female Minority fFemale
(1) (2) (3)
Femaleness of category −0.369* −0.584*** −0.430**
(0.20) (0.11) (0.18)
Part A Score in category −0.154*** −0.099*** −0.167***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Constant 3.161*** 2.687*** 3.034***
(0.22) (0.16) (0.23)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 192 414 138
R2 0.109 0.116 0.169
Note: Lower number in ranking indicated greater confidence. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. Controls include race dummy, UK high
school dummy.
*Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A3
OLS predicting Part B group confidence - (No) Impact of group composition.
For female For male
(1) (2)
Female majority −3.134 −2.997
(1.97) (2.66)
Male majority −0.000 −1.768
(2.80) (1.98)
Self confidence 0.439*** 0.427***
(0.03) (0.02)
Constant 33.245*** 28.790***
(3.20) (2.73)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 3720 3720
R2 0.450 0.446
Note: Standard errors are clustered at individual level. Controls include race dummy, UK
secondary school dummy, the overall probability of a correct answer for question i in Part B.
* Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table A4
OLS predicting position in line for Question i in Part B - Impact of feedback for players with best Part B score in category.
Pooled All female Female maj. Male maj. All male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Dummy 0.123** 0.286*** 0.163*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10)
Maleness of category −0.291*** 0.421*** −0.612*** −0.381*** 0.033
(0.08) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Female x Maleness 0.626*** 0.842*** 0.897***
(0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
Feedback −0.060 0.191** −0.021 0.030 −0.304***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
Female x Feedback −0.050 −0.104 −0.227**
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12)
Feedback x Maleness −0.119 −0.043 0.115 −0.096 −0.194
(0.09) (0.18) (0.22) (0.14) (0.17)
Female x Feedback x Maleness 0.240* 0.284 −0.200
(0.13) (0.26) (0.25)
Answered Qn. i Correctly −0.783*** −0.687*** −0.733*** −0.777*** −0.988***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Part A Score −0.036*** −0.119*** −0.021** −0.032*** −0.066***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 4.282*** 5.225*** 3.860*** 4.030*** 4.786***
(0.11) (0.38) (0.18) (0.19) (0.24)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4950 510 1890 1920 630
R2 0.305 0.392 0.305 0.2924 0.388
Note: Lower position in line indicated greater willingness to lead. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. Controls include treatment dummies, race dummy,
UK secondary school dummy, the overall probability of a correct answer for question i in Part B.
* Indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table A5
Variable means, standard deviations and correlations.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Position in line 2.60 1.17
2 Female 0.50 0.50 0.08
3 Maleness 0.03 0.42 −0.001 −0.08
4 Female x Maleness 0.001 0.30 0.11 0.003 0.70
5 Maleness x Mixed gender 0.03 0.36 −0.01 −0.06 0.84 0.57
6 Maleness x Mixed gender x
Female
0.004 0.25 0.10 0.02 0.58 0.83 0.69
7 Answered Q i Correctly 0.50 0.50 −0.48 −0.04 −0.01 −0.05 0.01 −0.03
8 Part A Score 15.08 3.23 −0.19 −0.19 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.14
9 Asian 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.07 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.12 −0.43
10 Mixed race 0.06 0.23 −0.02 0.10 −0.01 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.06 −0.11
11 Other race 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.11 −0.002 0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.11 −0.05 −0.03
12 UK secondary school 0.71 0.46 −0.16 −0.13 0.02 −0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.11 0.49 −0.47 0.08 −0.01
13 Q i Difficulty 0.50 0.24 −0.40 0.00 −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 0.48 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
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Fig. A1. Part C Instruction I.
Fig. A2. Part C Instruction II.
J. Chen and D. Houser The Leadership Quarterly 30 (2019) 101340
14
Fig. A3. Part C Instruction III.
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